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Nature of the Case 
The Appellant, Ronda Sue Reynolds (f.k.a. Lunders), has appealed from the court 
finding a substantial material change of circumstances and entering an Amended Decree 
of Divorce, entered by the Magistrate court of the District Court on May 9, 2014. 
Course of Proceedings 
A complaint for legal separation was filed by Ronda Reynolds (hereinafter 
"Ronda") on July 19, 2011, stating the parties separated on September 27, 2010. R., p. 
37-41. On July 19, 2012, the Magistrate Court entered an Amended Orders Regarding 
Amending Complaint, Child Custody, Child Support and Spousal Maintenance. R., p. 
89-93. 
Prior to entry of the Decree of Divorce, on September 13, 2012, Jeffrey Lunders 
(hereinafter "Jeffrey") filed a Motion to Modify Child Custody and Support Order 
(hereinafter referred to as "Jeffrey's Motion to Modify"). Motion to Modify filed 9/13/ 12. 
On December 20, 2012, the Magistrate Court entered the Decree of Divorce. R., p. 98-
107. The Decree of Divorce incorporated the custodial arrangements and child support 
contained in the July 19, 2012, Amended Orders. R., p. 99. On January 7, 8 and 9, 2014, 
the Magistrate Court held a trial on Jeffrey's September 2012 Motion to Modify. R., p. 
18; Tr.,p.1. 
The Court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law on February 14, 
2014, in writing. R., p. 136-149. The Amended Decree of Divorce was entered on May 
9, 2014. R., p. 152-165. Ronda timely filed her Notice of Appeal to the District Comi on 
May 21, 2014. R., p. 166-170. Ronda filed a Motion for Stay on June 2, 2014 which was 
APPELLATE BRIEF - 4 
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1 denied. R., p. 173-174. On May 27, 2014, Ronda filed a Motion to Reconsider Child 
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Support which \Vas likewise denied. R .. 
Appeal on June 2014.R.,p. 175-183. 
198-199. Ronda filed an Amended Notice of 
The appeal in front of the district court was heard before the Honorable Judge Jeff 
M. Brudie on December 18, 2014. Tr. p .1, R., p. 28. The district court entered its 
Opinion & Order on Appeal on January 30, 2015. R., p. 317-326. 
Ronda filed a petition for rehearing on March 23, 2015, which the district court 
denied. R., p. 350-360 and R., p. 376-377. 
Ronda filed this appeal on June 10, 2015. R., p. 398-403. 
Statement of Facts 
Ronda and Jeffrey are the parents of three children, WL born in 2000, AEL born 
in 2005 and ARL born in 2012. R., p. 99, p. 2, § JV. 
A complaint for legal separation was filed by Ronda on July 19, 2011. R., p. 37-
1 7 41. On July 19, 2012, the Magistrate Court entered Amended Orders Regarding 
18 
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Amending Complaint, Child Custody, Child Support and Spousal Maintenance 
(hereinafter "Amended Orders"). R., p. 89-93. The Amended Orders in part turned the 
underlying matter into a divorce and set forth the custodial arrangements. Id. On 
December 20, 2012, the Magistrate Court entered the Decree of Divorce in this matter 
that incorporated the custodial arrangements and child support contained in the July 19, 
2012 Amended Orders. R., p. 99; R., p. 89-93. The Decree of Divorce was nunc pro 
tune to September 11, 2012. Id. at 98. 
Three months prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, on September 13, 2012, 
Jeffrey filed Jeffrey's Motion to Modify. Motion to Modify filed 9/13/12. 
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On January 7, 8 and 9, 2014, the Magistrate Court held a trial on Jeffrey's 
September 2012 Motion to Modify. R., p. 18 and 137. The Court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 14, 2014, in writing (hereinafter ··FFCL"). R., 
p. 136-1../9. 
In the court's findings, it articulated it reasons for finding a permanent substantial 
material change of circumstances to modify the Decree of Divorce. 
1. Failure to have a psvchological exam and seek treatment (R., p. 143, 11 I). 
The court articulated its findings as follows: 
The court finds Ms. Reynolds consciously chose to avoid complying with the 
spirit of that agreement/order by seeking treatment for an entirely different 
situation. She sought treatment not based on the psychological finding of personal 
disorder, but rather got six (6) sessions of assertiveness training based on her 
representations to the treatment provider of being an abused victim. 
R., p. I .:/3, ~ 1. 
The court order that the court was referring to states that: 
Plaintiff shall undertake a psychological evaluation and shall follow all 
recommendations, if any, of said evaluation. Plaintiff shall sign a limited 
release for Defendant's counsel to obtain counseling records to confirm 
that Plaintiff has completed an evaluation and is following the treatment 
plan, if any, until she is released by her counselor. Defendant's counsel is 
not authorized to know what the treatment plan is, if any, only to receive 
information that she is attending or has been released from treatment. 
At R., p. 92, fil lc However, the court order does not indicate that Ms. Reynolds is 
to obtain a psychological exam for a "Personality Disorder, NOS". Instead, the order 
indicates that Ronda is to "undertake a psychological evaluation and shall follow all 
recommendations if any .... " The order further indicates that Jeffrey is not entitled to the 
records or information as to what type of treatment she is obtaining. See, R., p. 92, ~l lc. 
In the FFCL, the court concedes that the order does not require a psychological 
exam and/or treatment for a "personality disorder NOS." The comi acknowledges there 
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is no specific treatment in the order by stating that that Ronda "consciously chose to 
complying with the spirit of the agreement/order'". See R., p. J.13. By finding that 
Ronda was required to obtain an evaluation and obtain treatment for a "personality 
disorder NOS'' the comi abused its discretion by adding a condition to the order that was 
not clearly stated in the order. 
Additionally, Dr. Wilson indicated in his evaluation that he obtained Ronda's 
records from Dr. Kwon. Tr. Ex. 541 p. 5; Tr., p. JO../, L. ../-7. Dr. Wilson's records 
indicated that Ronda had obtained an evaluation and treatment. Dr. Wilson's evaluation 
indicates that Dr. Kwon sent correspondence (dated May 29, 2012), reporting that the 
treatment was completed. Tr. Ex. 5../1 p. 5; Tr., p. 104, L. 4-7. Ronda testified that she 
obtained this treatment based upon Dr. Kwon's recommendation. Tr., p.277, L. 17- p. 
278, L.23. The treatment was completed prior to July 19, 2012, when the Amended 
Orders were entered and five months before the Decree of Divorce was entered. 
The Amended Decree of Divorce was entered on May 9, 2014. R., p. 152-165. 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
This court is hearing this matter in its appellate capacity and not conducting a trial 
de nova, it cannot reweigh the evidence, nor determine the credibility of the witnesses 
and evidence. Ronda is not requesting that this comi reweigh the evidence presented at 
trial but to apply the applicable legal standards and act within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion. The trial court failed to apply the proper legal standards and further acted 
outside of the outer boundaries of its discretion in reaching its decision. 
This Court reviews a judge's decision regarding the custody of a minor child for 
an abuse of discretion, which involves a three-tiered inquiry: 
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... [W]hether the lower court rightly perceived the issues as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." [Citations omitted]. 
Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho at 715, 170 P.3d at 380 (2007). 
District Court failed to apply the correct legal standard in this case and wrongfully 
denied Ronda's Petition for Rehearing. The District comi and the magistrate court 
incorrectly analyzed prong two and three as set out in Nelson r. Nelson. The lower court 
I) applied the incorrect legal standard to this case and 2) then compounded the error by 
exceeding its discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
The district court and trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear Jeffrey's Motion 
to Modify. This court should vacate the Amended Divorce Decree as it is void judgment. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b ), 60( c) and estoppel doctrine bar this motion being 
granted. Instead Jeffrey's Motion to Modify was a re-litigation of the custody 
determination that the parties stipulated to in September 2012 which is prohibited Idaho 
case law, Rules of Civil Procedure and statutes. 
Even if this court determines that the lower courts had jurisdiction to hear the 
motion to modify, there was no substantial material permanent change of circumstance 
which support a change in custody as this was simply a re-litigation of the custody 
decision that the parties had stipulated to. Further, the magistrate court incorrectly 
imposed language into the Decree of Divorce that was not present committing a 
fundamental error. The District Court failed to recognize and correct these errors on 
appeal. 
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I. ·whether the court had suhiect matter jurisdiction to hear .Jeffi'ev 's ,\1otion 
to A!odi[i•. 
In a custody matter, subject matter jurisdiction over minor children is generally 
not lost until the children reach the age of majority. McGr[ff v. 1vfcGr[ff; 140 Idaho 624, 
99 P.3d 111 (2004). In kfcGrifl v. Afc:Gri[J; the Father argued that the magistrate court 
had lost subject matter jurisdiction of the custody matter as the court dismissed both 
Mother and Father's dueling Petitions to Modify. Id. at 646, 115. The McGr{[f Court 
found that where both parents treat dueling petitions to modify as properly filed even 
after they were dismissed and proceeded to trial, the court is not divested of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Id 
In this case, jurisdiction was never conferred on the magistrate court to hear a 
motion to modify as the Respondent moved to modify an interlocutory order1• Subject 
The court In re Termination of Parental Rights of Doe, more particularly 
described what an interlocutory order was. 
Although this Court has not previously defined the term "interlocutory 
order," much less attempted to define the distinction between an 
interlocutory order and a final order, our previous decisions suggest that 
the critical distinction is that an interlocutory order is subject to 
modification, amendment, or outright reversal by the judge entering that 
order. See State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 736, 240 P.3d 575, 582 
(20 I 0) (" [A] court retains broad discretion over interlocutory evidentiary 
rulings which may be modified at any time until entry of final judgment.") 
(quoting Ritter v. State, 272 Ga. 551, 532 S.E.2d 692, 695 (Ga. 2000)); 
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank ofN Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 
823, 800 P.2d 1026, 103 7 (1990) (trial courts deciding motions to 
reconsider pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B) " should take into account any 
new facts presented by the moving pmiy that bear on the correctness of the 
interlocutory order." ). The preeminent legal dictionary defines 
"interlocutory: as " Provisional; interim; temporary; not final." Black's 
Law Dictionary 731 (5th ed. 1979). By contrast, a" final order" is" [o]ne 
which terminates the litigation between the parties and the merits of the 
case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has 
been determined." Id. at 567. In our view, the Michigan Supreme Court 
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matter jurisdiction is never waived under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(1 ). This 
court correctly cited that the magistrate court had continuing jurisdiction over a properly 
filed modification of a custody action until the child(ren) reached majority. I.C. § 32-
717; AfcGrfff'v. }vfcGrifl 140 Idaho 642,646, 99 P.3d 111 (2004). The McGriffcourt 
held that even where the magistrate comi dismissed both parties petitions for 
modification, the lower court still had subject matter jurisdiction as the parties proceeding 
to "treat the former petitions as properly filed before the court and proceed accordingly, 
the comi is not divested of jurisdiction." Id. 
In this case, Ronda never treated the motion to modify as properly filed before the 
court and fought the Motion to Modify since its entry. See Tr., p. 18, L. 13-p. 20, Ll 5. 
Unlike the facts in AfcGr{ff, in this case Ronda did not file a competing motion to modify 
and always argued that Jeffrey's motion was simply a re-litigation of the custody matter 
that he had subsequently agreed to. If Jeffrey really wanted to modify the custody, he 
should have followed the rules of civil procedure and not agreed to entry of the Decree of 
Divorce that awarded custody to Ronda. 
Recently, this Court has held where a party files a motion to modify an 
interlocutory order, subject matter jurisdiction is not conferred. Cook v. Arias, Idaho 
_ (February 6, 2015, No. 41745). 
Similar to the facts in Cook v. Arias, in this case, the parties stipulated to entry 
of the Amended Order which was an interlocutory order in July 2012. In December 
provided the best definition, when it stated: "It is the essence of an 
interlocutory order or decree that it may on final hearing be set aside, 
altered, changed, or modified." Wurzer v. Geraldine, 268 Mich. 286, 256 
N.W. 439,444 (Mich. 1934). 
320 P.3d 1262 (Idaho 2014). 
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2012, the court entered a Decree of Divorce which incorporated the terms of the 
Amended Orders. S'ee. R., p. 98-107. Months before the Decree of Divorce \Vas filed, 
Jeffrey filed his Motion to Modify the Amended Orders. lvfolion to Modifj 1, flled 9/J 3/12. 
As the Motion to Modify attempted to modify an interlocutory order, it should have been 
denied as jurisdiction was never conferred. At no time did Ronda ever agree by acts or 
statements that the Motion to Modify was proper. 1n fact, Ronda correctly argued this 
was simply an attempt to re-litigate a settled dispute, before the dispute was even settled. 
Jeffrey's motion to modify should have been denied as a matter of law because 
the Divorce Decree was the order that should have been moved to modify, not the July 
19, 2012 order. On September 13, 2011, prior to entry of the decree of divorce, the 
Jeffrey filed his motion to modify, citing Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c). Rule 60(c) 
only pertains to final orders not interlocutory orders. In effect, under Rule 60( c) Jeffrey 
attempted to modify a temporary order prior to entry of the final order. This motion 
should have been denied for being procedurally defective. 
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) and (6), the magistrate court had 
not jurisdiction to hear the motion to modify as Respondent attempted to modify an 
interlocutory order. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) describes what a final judgment is as follows: 
"Judgment" as used in these rules means a separate document entitled "Judgment" 
or "Decree". . ... A judgment is final if either it has been certified as final 
pursuant to subsection (b)(l) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all 
claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the 
action. 
APP ELLA TE BRIEF - 11 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Recent Idaho Supreme Court decisions have confirmed that the courts must 
distinguish what is a final judgment. Reed v. Reed. Idaho (December 2, 2014) 
(finding that because the purported final decrees included recitals, findings and 
conclusions the order/judgment was not final). Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
60( c) or 60(b ), care must be taken to ensure an interlocutory order is not attempted to be 
modified. Cook v. Arias, _ Idaho __ (February 6, 2015) (denying modification 
because they moved to modify an interlocutory order). 
Due to the difficulties that would result in not finalizing decrees that were meant 
to be finalized at the time, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order confirming all those 
orders/judgments that were meant to be final at entry of the judgment/order. 
WHEREAS there are a number of judgments that have been 
previously entered that do not comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(a) or Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 803; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any 
judgment, decree or order entered before April 15, 2015, that was intended 
to be final but which did not comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(a) or Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 803 shall be treated as a 
final judgment 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that as of April 15, 2015, all final 
judgments must comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) or Idaho 
Rule of Family Law Procedure 803. 
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In this case. it is undisputed that the Decree of Divorce was meant to be the final 
order resolving all issues in the case. However, the July 19, 2012. order could never have 
been a final order because it did not address all the issues AND it was not certified to be 
final. The July 19, 2012, Amended Orders indicates that it is meant to provide, among 
other issues, the final basis of custody and child support and that all other issues will be 
resolved at trial. See R, p. 92. What was left unresolved for fmiher trial was the parties' 
debt and property distribution. This is the definition of an interlocutory order. 
Jeffrey's sole remedy to modify a temporary order was to file a motion to 
reconsider its interlocutory order under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B). 
Jeffrey had fomieen days to file such a motion but failed to do so. Id. Two months later, 
Jeffrey is precluded from attempting to modify an interlocutory order under Rule 
11 (a)(2)(B). 
Alternatively, Jeffrey could have filed a motion to modify the final order under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b ). Jeffrey failed to file under that rule and is bound by 
his motion. 
2. Jeffrev's }.1otion to lvfodifj; failed to state a Claim upon which re!ie(could 
be granted 
Jeffrey's Motion to Modify requested that the Amended Orders be modified as 
follows: 
COMES NOW the Defendant herein, by and through his counsel of 
record, Thomas J. Clark, and pursuant to I.R.C.P Rule 60(c), respectfully 
moves to modify this Court's July 16°1, 2012 Orders Regarding Amending 
Complaint, Child Custody, Child Support, and Spousal Maintenance and 
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R.,p. 
in Support thereof and in accordance with the requirements of Rule 60( c ), 
hereby complains, states and alleges as follo\VS .... 
Jeffrey's Motion to Modify ends by praying for "an order of this court modifying 
the July 16t\ 2012 Orders Regarding Amending Complaint, Child Custody, Child 
6 Support, and Spousal lv!aintenance ... " Afotion to k!odifj:, filed 9/13/ 12, p. 5. Jeffrey's 
Motion to Modify should have been denied as his Motion to Modify failed to state a 
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claim as an interlocutory order is not modifiable. Id; Idaho Rule Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6). 
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) and (6), the magistrate court did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the motion to modify because you cannot modify an 
interlocutory order which was what he pleaded. 
In this case, it is undisputed that the Decree of Divorce was meant to be the final 
order resolving all issues in the case. However, the July 19, 2012, order never was a final 
order because it did not address all the issues and it was not certified to be final. The July 
19, 2012, Amended Orders indicates that it is meant to provide, among other issues, the 
basis of custody and child supp01i and that all other issues will be resolved at trial. See R., 
p. 92. What was left unresolved for further trial was the parties' debt and property 
distribution. Compare R., p. 98-107 to R., p 89-93. The Amended Order by definition 
was an interlocutory order. As articulated in Cook v. Arias, an order or judgment that 
does not resolve all issues in a matter cannot be a final judgment that is able to be 
modified. Cook v. Arias (a supplemental order that determined the custody of children 
was not the final order); and Doe v. Doe, 155 Idaho 660 (2013)(a motion to set aside an 
order granting adoption was not final order). 
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Interestingly, in entering the Amended Decree of Divorce, the magistrate court 
did not even indicate what it was amending. See R .. p. 152-165. 
3. Jeffrev's Motion to Modify was simplv a re-litigation of the issues. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223, 254 P .Jd 1219 
(2011) set out that a party cannot move to modify because they regret their decision to 
enter into a stipulated order. Id at 225-226, 254 P. 3d at 121-22. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has set out the standard to utilize when determining if 
there has been a substantial material change of circumstances. Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 
223, 225-26, 254 P.Jd 1219, 121-22 (2011) set out the standard that our courts follow: 
A Decree of Divorce granting custody of a minor child to one of 
the parties may not be modified unless there has been a material, 
permanent and substantial change in conditions and circumstances 
subsequent to entry of the original decree which would indicate to the 
court's satisfaction that modification would be for the best interest of the 
child." Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 93 Idaho 42, 47, 454 P.2d 756, 761 
(1969). The party petitioning for the modification bears the burden of 
proving that a substantial and permanent change has occurred. Chislett v. 
Cox 102 Idaho 295,298,629 P.2d 691,694 (1981). 
.... As Tomlinson indicates, the question of whether a "material, 
permanent and substantial change in conditions" exists is a preliminary 
question to whether and what changes in the custody order would be in the 
best interest of the child. The requirement reflects "a policy against 
continuous relitigation and alteration of custody decision." Chris/et!, l 02 
Idaho at 298, 629 P.2d at 694. 
While the material, pennanent and substantial change standard is a 
sound legal principle, care must be exercised in its application. The 
tendency is to search for some greatly altered circumstance in an attempt 
to pinpoint the change called for by the rule. Thus, the emphasis is placed 
on defining some change and making that change appear, in itself, to be 
material, permanent and substantial. This focus is misleading. The 
important portion of the standard is that which relates the change in 
conditions to the best interest of the child. The changed circumstance 
standard was designed as a matter of policy, to prevent continuous 
relitigation of custody matters. 
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determining if there vvas an emerging pattern that was not evident prior to the custody 
determination may allow other evidence to be heard at trial. Poe,)y v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 
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An emerging pattern which is not apparent in a first consideration may 
come into focus at some later time. The com1 should allow and consider 
all evidence relevant to a child's interest, not just that evidence which has 
emerged since previous orders. 
Poesy v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258, 261-62, 561 P.2d 400, 403-404 (internal citations 
omitted). 
In this case, Jeffrey filed a motion to modify the Amended Orders on September 
13, 2012. On December 12, 2012, two (2) months later, the court entered the Decree of 
Divorce. The Decree of Divorce specifically adopted the Amended Complaint, Child 
Custody, Child Suppo11 Order and Spousal Maintenance entered with the court on July 
19, 2012 [sic]. R., p. 98. 
Factually, this case is analogous with the facts in Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223, 
254 P .3d 1219 (2011 ). In Evans the Mother had stipulated and agreed to a modification 
of the custody agreement that gave the Father custody of their children. Id. Mother 
agreed to this modification because she was planning on moving to the State of 
Washington to go to college. Mother subsequently moved to Newman Lake, Washington 
and started working full time. Id. In January 2010, the parties entered an order modifying 
custody by stipulation. Id at 225, 1221. Mother decided not to go to school/college and 
petitioned the com1 for a modification four months after entry of the order modifying. Id. 
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magistrate court found that Mother working full-time instead of going to school did not 
constitute a substantial material change of circumstances and found that the court lacked 
jurisdiction to modify the custody order. The Idaho Supreme coUii took up the case on 
expedited review. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate's decision and held that 
where an emerging pattern which is was not apparent in the first litigation may become 
relevant at some later time. Id. at 227, 1223. The Evans Court held that "[c]are must be 
taken to avoid 'compartmentalizing' consideration of a child's best interest in successive 
attempts at custody modification. The best interest of a child, like its grow1h, is a matter 
of development." 
In this case the Decree of Divorce was entered with the comi on December 20, 
2012. In December 2012, Jeffrey agreed to the entry of the Decree of Divorce with the 
custody and child suppo11 provisions adopted into the Decree. The Decree of Divorce 
was entered with the court after Jeffrey's verified motion to modify filed in September 
2012. What was known and existed in December 2012 is the determining factor. All the 
evidence provided by Jeffrey is and was prior to the December 2012 order. Tr. p . .:/I 1, 
L.20-22, Trial Ex. 5.:/1 p. 5. There was an absence of any ongoing pattern allowing pre-
Decree of Divorce evidence. Poesy v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258, 561 P.2d 400 (1977). 
Specifically, Jeffrey makes allegations in his Motion to Modify of incidents on or 
in December 2011, July 31, 2012, August 1, 7, 13, 24, 31 2012, and September 5, 2012. 
Motion to Mod(fy, 9/13/12. Absolutely none of Jeffrey's allegations in the Motion to 
APPELLATE BRIEF - 17 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
II 
Modify relate to incidents after entry of the Decree of Divorce executed in December 20, 
20 I 2. and entered the same day. 
Jeffrey's filing of his Motion to Modify on September 13, 2012, was a '·buyer's 
remorse" as described in Evans v. Sayler. The filing was only three months before entry 
of the Decree of Divorce, but well after he found out what type of treatment that Ronda 
had obtained. Tr. p.411, L.20-22. 
Because Jeffrey's Motion to Modify was simply a re-litigaton of the previous 
divorce, this court should vacate the Amended Decree of Divorce. Jeffrey's Motion to 
Modify should be denied because all of the allegations in the motion are related to pre-
Decree of Divorce actions. 
4. The Divorce Decree was entered bv stipulation precluding this action and 
quasi-estoppel precludes this action. 
Additionally, Jeffrey should be estopped from taking inconsistent actions in filing 
his motion to modify and subsequently agreeing to entry of the Divorce Decree. Either 
Jeffrey agreed to the final orders or he wanted to modify the temporary orders. Jeffrey 
attempted to have it both ways and re-litigate the entire case. 
In Idaho the doctrine of quasi-estoppel requires: 
City o.f Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 
151, 879 P.2d 1078, 1084 (1994) (citing Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 
101 Idaho 1, 6, 607 P.2d 1055, 1060 (1980)). This Court has also written 
that " [ q]uasi-estoppel is essentially a last-gasp theory under which a 
defendant who can point to no specific detrimental reliance due to 
plaintiffs' conduct may still assert that plaintiffs are estopped from 
asserting allegedly contrary positions where it would be unconscionable 
for them to do so." Schoonover v. Bonner County, 113 Idaho 916, 919, 
750 P.2d 95, 99 (1988). "The doctrine classified as quasi-estoppel has its 
basis in election, ratification, affirmance, acquiescence, or acceptance of 
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benefits; and the principle precludes a party from asserting to another's 
disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by 
him." Id. 
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce. Inc., 48 P.3d 1241, 137 Idaho 352 (Idaho 2002) 
In this case, allowing Jeffrey to re-litigate the custody matter after agreeing to 
entry of the decree of divorce that settled the custody issues would allow Jeffrey to 
maintain inconsistent positions. Jeffrey either agreed to entry of the divorce decree or he 
did not. Allowing Jeffrey to maintain both positions would be unconscionable. 
5. Whether the magistrate court committed fundamental error bv inferring 
lam.me into the previous orders not otherwise stated. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it added terms to the Decree of Divorce 
sixteen (16) months after entry of the Decree that required specific treatment not included 
in the Decree. 
An abuse of discretion occurs when it failed to apply the correct legal standards 
applicable to the case and required treatment for a personality disorder. Danti v. Danti, 
204 P.3d 1140, 146 Idaho 929 (Idaho 2009) 
Child custody determinations are committed to the sound 
discretion of the magistrate judge. McGrfff v. lvfcGriff, 140 Idaho 642, 
645, 99 P.3d 111, 114 (2004). On appeal, this Court will overturn a 
magistrate's custody decision only if it is an abuse of discretion. Roberts v. 
Roberts, 138 Idaho 401, 403, 64 P.3d 327, 329 (2003). A custody award 
will not be regarded as an abuse of discretion so long as the trial court: (I) 
recognized the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer limits 
of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
available choices; and (3) reached its decision through an exercise of 
reason. Id. 
On the other hand, a trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a 
custody award based on evidence that is insufficient to conclude that the 
award is in the child's best interest. Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 713, 
170 P.3d 3 75, 3 78 (2007). A magistrate's findings of fact, however, will be 
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upheld if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence and 
are not clearly erroneous. Reed v. Reed, 13 7 Idaho 53, 56, 44 P.3d 1108, 
I 111 (2002). Evidence is substantial "if a reasonable trier of fact would 
accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact 
has been proven." King v. King, 137 Idaho 438, 442, 50 P.3d 453, 457 
(2002). When reviewing a magistrate's findings of fact, we view the 
evidence in favor of the magistrate's judgment and \Viii uphold the 
magistrate's findings even if there is conflicting evidence. Nelson, 144 
Idaho at 713, 170 P.3d at 378.We will not make credibility determinations 
or replace the trial court's factual findings by reweighing the evidence. Id. 
Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho at 934,204 P.3d at 1145. 
Jeffrey's Motion to Modify mentions Ronda's potential mental illness. Motion to 
Afod(fy, 9/13/12, p.5, ~8. However, the only testimony regarding Ronda's treatment 
admitted at trial was that Ronda had already completed her treatment prior to entry of the 
Decree of Divorce. Tr., p. 109, L.14-p. l JO, L. 3.; Tr., p. 277, L.14-p. 278, L. 23. Jeffrey 
even testified that he became aware of the treatment that Ronda had in 
October/November 2012. Tr., p. 411, L.16-22. Ronda obtained the treatment from Dr. 
1 7 Kwon in March and April 2012. Dr. Kwon even authored a May 29, 2012 letter 
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indicating the same that was considered in Dr. Wilson's report. Tr. Ex. 541 p. 5. 
Even with this knowledge, Jeffrey still stipulated to entry of the Decree of 
Divorce in December 2012. Jeffrey actions of stipulating to entry of the Decree of 
Divorce showed that he was comforiable with the treatment that Ronda obtained. To hold 
otherwise is to make meaningless Jeffrey's agreement for entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
In part, the magistrate court's FFCL made findings of permanent and substantial 
change of circumstances based upon Ronda's alleged mental condition. 
See R., p. 143. 
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In finding that Ronda's mental condition had worsened since entry of the Decree 
of Divorce, the court found that Ronda had avoided the "spirit of [the] agreement/order 
by seeking treatment for an entirely different situation." Nowhere in the Decree of 
Divorce was there any expression that Ronda had to obtain treatment for a personality 
disorder. Surely if the court and/or Jeffrey wanted Ronda to obtain specific treatment the 
order would have expressed the same. The court abused and went outside its 
discretionary decision making when it added new terms to the Decree of Divorce and the 
July 19, 2012 Amended Orders and eliminating other terms. 
The court ariiculated its findings as follows: 
The court finds Ms. Reynolds consciously chose to avoid complying with 
the spirit of that agreement/order by seeking treatment for an entirely 
different situation. She sought treatment not based on the psychological 
finding of personal disorder, but rather got six (6) sessions of assertiveness 
training based on her representations to the treatment provider of being an 
abused victim. 
FFCL p. 8, , 1. 
However, the Amended Orders that the magistrate court was refeITing to fully 
states that: 
Plaintiff shall undertake a psychological evaluation and shall follow all 
recommendations, if any, of said evaluation. Plaintiff shall sign a limited 
release for Defendant's counsel to obtain counseling records to confirm 
that Plaintiff has completed an evaluation and is following the treatment 
plan, if any, until she is released by her counselor. Defendant's counsel is 
not authorized to know what the treatment plan is, if any, only to receive 
information that she is attending or has been released from treatment. 
Amended Order, p. 4,, 1 lc. 
The Amended Orders do not indicate that Ms. Reynolds is to obtain a 
psychological exam for a personality disorder. Instead, the order indicates that Ronda is 
to "unde1iake a psychological evaluation and shall follow all recommendations if any 
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as to what of treatment she is obtaining. See A mended Orders pg. 4, il I I c. 
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In the FFCL, the court concedes that the order does not require a psychological 
exam and/or treatment for a personality disorder. R., p.136. The court acknmvledges 
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avoid complying with the spirit of the agreement/order". R., p. I 48. By finding that 
Ronda was required to obtain an evaluation and obtain treatment for a personality 
disorder the court abused its discretion by adding a condition to the order that was not 
clearly stated in the order. 
Further, the court disregarded the language of the Amended Order that limited 
Jeffrey's knmvledge to whether Ronda attended or was released from treatment. If Jeffrey 
was not allowed to have this information he could not have been complained as to the 
type of treatment that Ronda was to obtain. The Amended Order required Ronda to 
obtain treatment and provide to Jeffrey information that she attended and was released 
from treatment. It is undisputed that this occurred. The import of what type of treatment 
was to be required was not set out and clearly not important to Jeffrey at the time of 
divorce. This flies in the face of discretionary decisions. Requiring more than what an 
order states is contrary to the law in Idaho. Danti v. Danti, supra. 
Additionally, Dr. Wilson indicated in his evaluation that he obtained Ronda's 
records from when she saw Dr. Kwon. Tr., Ex. 541 p. 5; Tr., p. 104, L., 4-7. Dr. Wilson's 
records indicated that Ronda had obtained an evaluation and treatment. Dr. Wilson's 
evaluation indicates that Dr. Kwon sent correspondence (dated May 29, 2012), reporting 
that the treatment was completed. Tr., Ex. 541 p. 5; Tr., p. 104, L., 4-7. Ronda testified 
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17- 2 L. The treatment was completed prior to July 19. ,vhen the 
Amended Orders were entered and five months before the Decree of Divorce \Vas 
entered. This error was fundamental error and the matter should be vacated. 
Harmless error has been defined by our courts as an error which does not affect a 
substantial right of a party. Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 274 P.3d 1249 
(2012); Highland Enters., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 986 P.2d 996 (1999) (allowing 
evidence in that affects a substantial right of one of the parties is not harmless error); 
L&L Furn. 1'1art, Inc. v. Boise ·water C01p., 120 Idaho 107, 813 P.2d 918 (Ct. App. 
1991 ). 
Here, the magistrate added additional requirements to an order and applied those 
requirements to the Ronda which required her to get specific treatment for a personality 
disorder. This court decision affected the substantial rights of the Ronda as she lost 
custody of the parties' children. This error was far from harmless and should be set aside. 
R.,p. 8. 
The trial court allowed the testimony of experts regarding the Ronda's mental 
condition in over the objection of the Ronda's counsel See Tr., p. 428, L. 16 - p.430, L. 
1. (counsel indicated it was a continuing objection). The evidence presented was known 
prior to entry of the Decree of Divorce. The trial court also allowed testimony of 
witnesses of acts that occurred pre-divorce decree over the objection of the Ronda's 
objection. Tr., p. 428, L. 16 - p..:/30, L. 1. This testimony and evidence was known prior 
to entry of the Decree of Divorce. Allowing this evidence in over the objection of the 
Ronda was a fundamental error that affected the substantial rights of the Ronda. 
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Because the court abused its discretion the Amended Decree of Divorce should be 
vacated. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Attorney fees and costs were requested by Ronda in front of the magistrate court. 
See Complaint for Legal Separation. R., p. 39. Ronda cited I.C. §32-705 and §32-704. 
R., p. 39. Attorney fees and costs should be awarded in this matter based upon the I.C. 
§§ 32-704, 705 and 718. Ronda should also be awarded attorney fees and costs under 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure l l(a)(l). 
IC§ 32-70.:f. allows the court to order the payment of attorney fees and costs for 
defending an action under IC § 32-701 et seq. JC § 32-70.:f.(3). The court is to take 
into consideration the financial resources of the parties in making such award. Id. In this 
case, the Motion to Modify was frivolously filed and without any foundation. That in 
conjunction with the difference in the parties financial resources, Jeffrey making 
$64,352.00 and Ronda being imputed minimum wage, the court should order an award of 
attorney fees and costs. 
This court should also find that the Motion to Modify brought by Jeffrey was 
vexatious and constituted harassment. I. C. § 32-718. This statutory provision requires 
where a modification action is vexations and harassing, the court shall assess attorney 
fees and costs. In this case, the Motion to Modify was brought prior to entry of any final 
order and as discussed herein was simply a re-litigaton of the stipulation the parties 
entered into. This is vexatious and harassing litigation. On its face, Jeffrey's Motion to 
Modify was an attempt to have his cake and eat it too. Jeffrey agreed to entry of the 
Divorce Decree and even made a motion for entry of the Decree. R., p. 10. Jeffrey 
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temporary orders on custody. Jeffrey got what he wanted, the divorce and custody 
provisions. Jeffrey should not have been allowed to continue to litigate this matter. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(3) also allows an avvard of attorney fees and 
costs were an action was brought without 
... [R]easonable inquiry [that] it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause the unnecessary delay 
or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l l(a)(3). 
The facts of this case allow an award under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
11 ( a)(3 ). This action was harassing in nature, not based upon any reasonable inquiry nor 
was there any argument to modify or reverse any existing law. This was simply a re-
litigation of the custody provisions subsequently decided. 
IC. § 12-121 also provides for attorney fees and costs to be awarded when an 
action was brought frivolously, unreasonably and without any foundation. Jensen v. 
Jensen, 128 Idaho 600,917 P.2d 757(1996). The purpose of Idaho Code§ 12-121 is to 
serve as a deterrent to groundless action and to provide remedy for persons who have 
borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges. 
Bogner v. State Department of Revenue and Taxation, Stare Tax Com 'n, 107 Idaho 854, 
693 P.2d 1056 (1984). 
CONCLUSION 
The magistrate judge abused his discretion in modifying child custody and child 
support. The lower court utilized incorrect standard and allowed Jeffrey to re-litigate this 
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interlocutory order and the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the action. The motion \Vas 
also barred by the legal doctrine of estoppel and the rules of civil procedure. Further, the 
trial court abused its discretion when it inserted additional requirements to the Decree of 
6 Divorce and Amended Orders. This abuse was a fundamental error. The Amended 
7 Decree of Divorce should be vacated. 
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